Close examination of the south Lebanon issue have shown how idealistic can go theLebanese channels. An Nahar newspaper titled: “L.B.C. / Future TV linking the
country, and create togetherness”. (An Nahar, 24 may 2000).Such common approach is due to the emergence of an outsider ‘other’ which is Israel.
In this case the media applied the Lebanese popular say: “my brother and I against mcousin, and my cousin and I against the foreigner”. To put it otherwise the Muslim
considered the Christian as an insider ‘other’ and vice versa, but when it comes to thethreat from the outside, they united against it.
C) The basketball and the media: ‘from a new trend to a
national tale’.
Various strands of nationalism may be identified and are rarely explicit in nature, acodified but nonetheless inseparable element of sport. One must first determine whysport is evidently an appropriate avenue for the expression of nationalistic spirit.
Rowe and Lawrence (1986) asserted that this is because sport is a particularlycompelling ideological cement…it encourages the suspension of…antagonism infavour of a fabled national interest” (Rowe & Lawrence, 1986, p. 203). According toBlain et al (1993) sport as a whole “constitutes a particularly elaborated symbolic
system” (Blain et al, 1993, p. 186), take place in competitive framework and as such,give rise to the semiotic-friendly idea of nationalism.
The media as a fourth estate, with their ability to create or reinforce public opinioncan perpetuate notions on nationalism. Rowe and Lawrence (1986) argued the
purpose of nationalism when combined with sport is to attempt to distinguishnationhood from that of others.
BARCODE
63
This section intends to study how the relationship between sports, national identityand the media, has formed in the last decade in Lebanon, and the extent to which this
has implicated sport in the construction of a particular version of Lebanese nationalidentity shall be examined later in this section. Thus my viewpoint is closelyconnected with the framework of nationality and the concepts of nation-building,collective experience and national identity. However, this section does concentrate onthe media presentation of the Lebanese victory in the Asian Basketball Championship
in 1999.Sports in Lebanon: a round-up.
Likely to other sectors and institutions, the sports in Lebanon have been affectedduring the years of war. According to Ali Safa9, senior sports commentator at Future
TV described the situation at that time as pathetic. A full destruction of the sportsarenas, breaking up of the sports federations; sectarian issues emerged among the
teams who were divided according to their religious identity, which deprived Lebanonto be represented in international sporting competitions.
Hariri10’s first government in 1993 gave a great importance to the sports sector in itsreconstruction strategy. Millions of dollars were invested in the reconstruction of new
modern sports arenas throughout the country, and got ready to host national, regionaland international sports competitions.
9 Ali Safa, interviewed on March 29, 2004.#p#分页标题#e#10 Rafik Hariri: is the current Lebanese prime minister. He came for the first time into power in
1993.Mr. Hariri, one of the richest in the world, has launched in 1993 the reconstruction strategy ofLebanon.
BARCODE
64
In the last decade, Lebanon came back again on the regional and international sports
agenda, new sports fields were explored. In team games, they have enjoyed some
notable successes, not least Lebanese’ ice hockey players have fared even better,
winning World titles, and last year the Mediterranean championship in snowboarding
since Lebanon is the only Middle Eastern country that enjoys snow and winter sports.
The list of Lebanese sporting achievements could be continued for some time. Butperhaps the most remarkable of all was the 1999’s Asian Basket Ball Championship
when the Lebanese Basket ball team became the Asian Basket ball champion. The
fact remains that Lebanon acquired a sporting national identity thanks to the media
which have performed consistently well at the highest level in a variety of sports.
The ‘Green Saga’: the victory of a nation.
Examining the current news bulletins on television nowadays in Lebanon, one will
notice that the opening news stories are about national basketball and that basketball
topics seize a considerable amount of prime time news. Back some years ago, news
bulletins included a separate sports news segment, coming usually at the end of the
news program.
Not just in the news, many other shows have been produced since the victory of the
national team on the international level in Asian Basketball Championship 1999.
L.B.C, which had enjoyed an exclusive coverage for the Asian Basketball
Championship, produced a special documentary called ‘Green Saga ’about the
achievements of the national team. It documented the journey of the national team
during the championship. The documentary discourse, narratives and jargons have a
clear sense of nationalism and national flavour.
BARCODE
65
The documentary framed the victory as a nation’s dream; this dream exceeds its
geographical boundaries. Its men are mighty, brave warriors to realize it into fact.
Those men came from different background to represent one united nation called
Lebanon. They have brotherly cooperated to meet the dream and to make out of it a
national myth for the coming generations. Those men were called the ‘descendants of
the land of the cedars’11. The last part of the documentary showed the team’s return to
Lebanon. This segment was titled ‘here come the true Lebanese’. And the true
Lebanese is understood as the new generation who cast aside the sectarian identity for
the sake of their nation.
The documentary holds many national meanings and interprets the concept of#p#分页标题#e#
pluralism and conviviality. Starting with, the title ‘Green Saga’: the ‘green’ is not just
the uniform colour of the national team, but also the symbol of Lebanon and its
distinguished green nature known by lifelong pine and cedars trees. Such
identification implied that the victory will live as long as those trees and it will be
connected to the nation as its trees. As well as the word ‘saga’, has to create a kind of
myth to be transmitted from a generation to another.
Furthermore, the key element of the Lebanese national identity, conviviality and
plurality for one national identity, was well interpreted in this documentary. The
plurality is the different sectarian identities of the players. The conviviality is their
cooperation and being re-united as a national team once again, aiming to hold the
name of their country to the highest international achievements.
11 The cedar tree or as it is internationally known as ‘Cedars of Lebanon’ is the national symbol of
Lebanon. Know as a lifelong tree, the Lebanese believe that it is a holy tree, since it was mentioned
several times in the Bible. In Lebanon they call it the ‘Cedars of the Lord’.
BARCODE
66
According to Hobsbawm (1983), competitive sports have functioned as an institution
through which nationalist meanings have been naturalized and brought into people’s
everyday lives. This is enabled by the nature of competitive sports, which is based on
the opposition of the participants. Indeed, sports have been called “a war without
weapons” and it has been considered as one of the most important means to reinforce
national identification especially in countries where other means of “validation” have
been scarce (cf. Bale & Sang 1996).
Thus, the use of the word ‘worriers’ in the documentary, signifies that the games were
like a battlefield. The confrontation with the ‘other’, like China and South Korea, well
experienced countries and hundred times much bigger than Lebanon, means that the
competition was on its highest level. Furthermore, allowing for the fact that Lebanon
is a country under reconstruction in all its fields, which might understood that
victories have greater importance in relative terms.
While success in sports was seen to provide a meaning of projecting national image to
a national and international public, the Lebanese national team confrontations with the
‘others’ has also created opportunities for strengthening beliefs about the unique
character of ‘our’ nation in the light of the real or imagined difference of the ‘others’
(Hobsbawm, 1983, pp. 142-4).
The extensive use of words such as ‘we the Lebanese’, ‘our nation is playing’, ‘our#p#分页标题#e#
Lebanese players’, ‘Go Lebanon, Go; Long live Lebanon’; ‘here comes the real
Lebanese’; ‘these are our heroes’; in the media narratives and discourses intended to
boost up the national feelings and to create into the Lebanese people the love to the
fatherland, in other words to create a Lebanon well valuable for the Lebanese.
BARCODE
67
Creating a Lebanese role model:
Rowe and Lawrence identify that “through the identification of the sports champion
with the nation we are asked to celebrate a country’s power and strength” (Rowe &
Lawrence, 1986, p. 198). In this respect, the national team players, in particular the
two main players, Elie Mshantaf (Christian) and Fadi Khatib (Muslim) who scored
the victory, were turned into national idols and narratives of sports victories. They
were depicted as Lebanese brothers, cooperating together to meet their target, and
have the essential characteristics for an ideal brave Lebanese Youngman.
Thus, it is not surprising why youths have the same haircuts, want to dress like them,
or trying to have a sporty lifestyle like them, as well as talking about their nation
victory and their dream to be Lebanese basketball players.
And since the Lebanese modern society lacks heroes from the present times, the
winners hence serve as propagandists for the ultimate aims of the state, and
nonetheless serve to accentuate the potential power of sport and the media thereof, in
the creation or reinforcing of nationalist sentiment. One may assert that it is in the
media depiction of the sport where this synonym occurs. It is with this assertion that
analysis of power of the media becomes essential, most particularly regarding the
importance of media forces in the projection of an image and promotion nationalism
and national imageries.
Sports have been prized in this documentary because of the contribution which it is
believed to make the fabric of Lebanese society, in particular among the young
generation.
BARCODE
68
For those youngsters, such image of Lebanon as a sporting nation leaves a definite
lasting impression. It is undeniable that, for most of the last decade, Lebanon has
managed to avoid sectarian division at least in the sport.
The actual semiotics of the operation of the sporting events, supplemented by the
L.B.C coverage thereof, do much to accentuate fervour and creation of identity which
may constitute nationalism and a media audience being forced to identify with the
nation through the sport. This strand of nationalism is codified through the simple
nature of the Lebanese national basketball achievements world wide. It appears to be
structured to foster national sentiment and identification and glorify nation.
Achievement in sports has also another role, in that it was expected to create that#p#分页标题#e#
Lebanese, are strongly united. Victories in sports created the meaning for the newly
recovered Lebanese nation desperately needed collective traditions, experiences and
heroes to increase national consciousness and integration.
This section tried to explore the contribution made by mediated sport to the
construction of Lebanese national identity in the period of reconstruction –It shall be
argued that, sport not only reflected the contemporary articulation of Lebanese
national identity but also played an important part in the construction and
consolidation of the particular sense of identity being expressed.
D) Beirut - plural, singular, and common: creating a ‘we space’.
In the AVIL Guidebook, it is asserted that the media should highlight Lebanon’s
archaeological, historical, artistic and cultural landmarks. On the other hand, the
current president of the republic Mr. Emile Lahoud, launched what it has been called
BARCODE
69
“the national glory day” on the 10th of August of each year. He aimed to give the
Lebanese, the opportunity to have accesses to the presidential, governmental, and
parliament palaces and also, free entrance to the museums, archaeological sites and
galleries; in a way to create a sense of nationalism, love to their fatherland and a
collective memory.
The media on this occasion, in particular L.B.C. and Future TV, have played a
significant role in promoting the cultural heritage, history, and the Lebanese
Landmarks.
Both channels rescheduled their day agenda to telecast special reports and live shows;
they made the tour of the archaeological and historical sites, talking about the ancient
peoples and civilizations who established in Lebanon since ages, reflecting in that the
diversity and the richness of the Lebanese history. But the most remarkable among
all, was a documentary produced by Future TV in 2003, about the capital Beirut.
The documentary begins with archived images of the fifteen years war, that
transformed the capital city, Beirut, from the ‘Paris of the Mediterranean’ to a bloody
battleground of rival sectarian factions. Once celebrated as the ‘Paris of the
Mediterranean’ and a playground for the elite of the Arab world, Beirut in the 1970s
and 1980s became notable primarily as a haven for terrorists, neologism
‘Beirutization’ has joined ‘Balkanization’ in the lexicon of social disintegration.
BARCODE
70
The very next images shifted to highlight on the city, more than a decade after the
civil war; Beirut is in the final stages of a multi-billion-dollar reconstruction effort
that has attempted to re-create the ‘old’ cosmopolitan Beirut and to transform the city
centre into a sanitized Middle Eastern theme park (Makdisi, 1997; Kubursi, 1999).#p#分页标题#e#
The documentary tends to speak of Beirut as an almost magical place where the
romantic Arab world meet Western sophistication- a place embodying a sanguine
combination of glamour and warmth, openness and kin-based insularity,
cosmopolitanism and distinctive ‘local’ character.
In this respect, and despite the efforts to recast Beirut as a stable, unified place, the
city holds over the meanings of Lebanese identity and nationhood. The competing
meanings rooted in the Lebanese turbulent history.
In interpreting the documentary, the reconstruction process has been represented in
the media not only as a rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, but, equally an
attempt to reinterpret Lebanon’s tumultuous past and to create a new collective
memory of the Lebanese ‘nation.’ The city is represented, in this respect, as a text of
an ongoing discourse about the shape and meaning of Lebanese nationhood and
identity. And like many texts, the built environment is significant not only for what it
says, but for what it neglects to say about the past and the present (Till, 1999;
Johnson, 1994).
Focusing on the capital has many connotations. Since the end of the civil war, a
nation-building agenda has infused the country’s reconstruction. Reconstruction
efforts have centred on Beirut—the centre of Lebanon’s financial services industries
and the engine of its economic growth since independence.
BARCODE
71
The concentration of redevelopment in Beirut in the media also has an important
symbolic dimension. Beirut was for years a virtual power vacuum, fragmented into
militarized slums and subject to constant outside intervention. The city was essentially
the capital of a state that had ceased to exist, and of a ‘nation’ which had never
inspired the allegiance of its inhabitants.
The centrepiece of the documentary has been the rebuilding of the 180 hectare of
Beirut. In contrast to pre-war laissez-faire development, the new city centre
development has been planned in great detail and centrally controlled. And, it has
made tangible its new image of a united and civic-minded Lebanon. This is meant to
signal the beginning of legitimate, centralized authority where there had been political
chaos and fragmentation.
The documentary enthusiastically described these as places where people can mingle
as they once did. Significantly, in this sense, the media conceive of public spaces not
as a new feature of Beirut’s landscape, but as a return to an authentic, pre-war Beirut.
The public spaces of Beirut, along with the re-created [souks] markets and refurbished
commercial and residential districts, are understood as the revival of a genuine Beirut,
where Muslims and Christians intermingled as friends and neighbours. These spaces,#p#分页标题#e#
documentary suggests, capture a uniquely Lebanese ethos of openness and diversity,
and are a material representation of a common Lebanese identity.
Significantly, some of these new public spaces shown in the documentary are
organized around archaeological sites uncovered during the demolition of war-torn
buildings.
BARCODE
72
The priority given to archaeological preservation reflects a purposeful effort not only
to draw tourists to the city centre, but, quite literally, to excavate the heritage of the
‘Lebanese people,’ and in so doing to indicate the continuity between today’s
citizenry and Lebanon’s ancient inhabitants. The Phoenician and ‘Levantine’ elements
of that heritage have been given the most play, as they embody the images of the
Lebanese nation favoured by Lebanese.
More cynically, the documentary stressed on the preservation of Lebanon’s ancient
monuments that it has to signify a concerted effort to bury and to deny the country’s
more recent past. A striking element of the documentary is the lack of scenes of a
substantial public memorial to the civil war or to its victims.
This glaring forgetfulness of the landscape is at least partly explainable, since neither
the state nor the media seem willing to address openly the memories that undoubtedly
loom largest in the minds of Beirut’s citizens.
In the media, the new Beirut should serve as a symbol of Lebanon’s civic-minded
future rather than as reminder of its dismal recent past.
The media coverage of the city centre has attempted to generate—or from their
perspective, revive—a civic consciousness and unified national identity. Through the
documentary, the new Beirut is designed to represent a national space where a decade
earlier there had been only rubble and gutted-out structures.
BARCODE
73
Chapter VIII
Conclusion & confirmation of the theoretical framework.
Lebanon’s most famous singers ‘Fairouz’ sings, “What is Lebanon?” before
answering: “a few cedars attracting the attention of the whole world.” nationalist -
chauvinistic exaggeration often goes hand in hand with the actual weakness of a
nation. This is particularly true in times of pain and desolation, as it was in Lebanon
where constructed “Lebanonism”- an expression of crafted nationalism- provided a
psychological refuge for its citizens. This is only normal; nations are often built
through the pain and suffering, as products of nationalism. As Hobsbawm (1983) put
it, nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalisms but
the other way around. Peoples first seek togetherness and then translate it into
geographical terms, surrounding themselves with borders.
From the theoretical framework, national identity is understood as a social construct,#p#分页标题#e#
which involves the construction of two elements: the object of self- ascription and the
bonds which link a person to a nation be it blood ties, collective experience, culture,
history etc...Nation identity as well is constructed not only through the identification
of its sources and the formation of its symbols, but also through the construction of
“others”, which allow a nation to define itself with the use if contrast.
On the other hand, the Lebanese media, which served as a mean of war in the hands
of the sectarian parties, have had an endemic problem in building their nation. In the
media in particular the television channels, the state has never fully been taken for
granted in Gellner’s words, and nationalism had a strong sectarian colouring. In
BARCODE
74
Lebanon, allegiance to sect comes before allegiance to country. Sectarianism is the
most outstanding characteristic of the Lebanese society. It is also one of the main ills
that weighs heavily on the mind and work of the Lebanese people.
Every Lebanese sect has its own version of history and identity that can incite tension
between them. Admittedly, the Hobsbawm-Gellner ideal type, however, was a very
tall order in the limited period provided Lebanon since independence.
The discussion in the previous chapters reflects how the media in Lebanon,
particularly, the television is interpreted and defined: what is considered national
identity , in terms of ‘plurality and conviviality’ and what is anti- national identity in
terms of ‘sectarian divisions’.
The analysis of television in Lebanon has shown that, in spite of the descriptions of
mass media in general and television in particular as vital instruments in and for the
process of nation-building and the development of a national collective identity, there
are only few shows which seem to be deliberately designed and used to serve that
purpose. Firstly, the national campaigns may be interpreted as carrying an implicit
framing of the nation-building by introducing the new concept to the society.
Secondly, the sports documentary “Green Saga” is a positive step in the right
direction to develop implicitly a supra national identity among Lebanese. The Asian
Basketball Championship is an arena through which is possible to manipulate the
sectarian images of Lebanon and its population. In fact, it is often argued that sports
arenas have become places for producing images of national heroes and victories that
are comparable to the images of the battlefields and war heroes in national narratives
(Archetti, 1994, p. 232).
BARCODE
75
The success in sports was seen as means of projecting a national image to a national
and international public. As well as “its usefulness of understanding the ‘us’ within#p#分页标题#e#
nation-state”. (Bale and Sang, 1996: 17; Hill, 1996; 1-6). L.B.C. has played an
important role in this process, by constructing, legitimizing and reinforcing the
national imagery of Lebanon and the Lebanese as both an insider and outsider agent.
As Bale and Sang (1996) argued that apart from war, no other form of bonding serves
to unite a nation better than representational sports.
And thirdly, the documentary on Beirut at Future TV shows the plurality of the capital
city and its diversity throughout its history. History is another important source of
national identity. It provides a source for the construction of “we-space”; it
symbolizes the everlasting commitment of Lebanese to their freedom, to the
independence of their state. Unfortunately, recovering a sense of the History may not
be an easy task. The past can be clouded.
But it is also possible to discern an even more significant treatment of history. History
is not only what it was long ages ago; history is created every day, every moment, and
the members of a nation are directly involved in its development. The feeling of
creating history is conditioned by the experience of fights for independence, building
and rebuilding their nation, or simply living together and making decisions-this is the
most source of national identity.
Although, in the news section, the ‘togetherness’ depends on the identity of the ‘other;
whether, the other is an outsider or insider. Since for each sect the ‘other’, might live
around the corner. The ‘we’ in the news, are the members of the same community
itself. But on the international level, such as the issue of South Lebanon and its
confrontation with Israel, the ‘we’ broaden its meaning to cover all the groups.
BARCODE
76
The example of Lebanese television proved what Heidt (1987) suggested that national
identity is something which can be ‘created’. It also concurred with Price’s (1995)
argument that everyone shares the national identity above party or ‘sectarian’
concerns. Indeed, there are no basic divisions between Lebanese people in terms of
ethnic divisions. There are religious communities, which should not be mistaken for
ethnic groups. The Lebanese share in Smith’s (1991) words, a historic territory,
common myths, and historical memories, mass, public culture, and common legal
rights and duties for all its communities.
However, I shall conclude that the interpretation of the AVIL/TAEF is not fully
achieved yet. The AVIL terms are seemingly broad in their definition, “not all of its
terms are strictly applied” as Abdul Hadi Mahfouz12 discussed. The Lebanese
National Audio-Visual Council - set up in 1996 to license and monitors the private
broadcast media - still does not have the budget, facilities, location, permanent staff#p#分页标题#e#
and equipment to carry out its "monitoring" activities. Even if it did, its powers are
minimal. The sectarian identity, still explicit in the private channels, since the
licensing is based on sectarian partition; therefore one cannot put blames on the
private channels, or even to have great expectations. On the other hand, The PSB13
which supposed to play a more effective role is weak and lost its viewer ships.
The AVIL should be reconsidered and readapted to the media mechanism and the
social construction. The absence of clauses related to the minorities, or the Arabic
language, religious shows and many others.
12 Abdel Hadi Mahfouz is the general director of the Lebanese National Audio-Visual Media Council.
Interviewed in 25th of March 2004.
13 PSB: the Public Service Broadcasting. It is meant there the state owned channel “Tele Liban”.
BARCODE
77
The new laws and narratives must eliminate everything that creates conflict between
Lebanese in order to facilitate the healing process. Nevertheless, the 1994 Audio-
Visual Media Law has been applied, to prune the chaotic proliferation of small
broadcasting stations that mushroomed during the civil war, by dramatically relicensing,
and rationalizing the system, motivated in some part by the need to bring a
greater degree of order to their airwaves. It also did so by an unarticulated formula
that in practice reflected the distribution of power within the country: one station for
the Catholics, one for Orthodox Christians, one for the moderate Shiite Muslim and
other for the more militant Hezbollah, another for the Sunni Muslims, and so on.
The new Lebanon, for instance, has maintained the division of political offices by sect
and, according to some commentators, has “perpetuated the political power of the
"sects’ lords" who divided the running of the country between themselves.” (Asmar et
al, 1999, p. 36). The new political establishment has seized upon this emergent and
fragile sense of sovereign nationhood among Lebanese.
Sectarianism is a problem not of the past but of the present. Although it is constructed
as the dark deviant underside of the nationalist narrative, sectarianism is a nationalist
creation that dates back no further than the beginnings of the modern era when
European powers and local elites forged a politics of religion amid the emerging of
sectarianism in a country where the citizen is given little choice between the
exclusionary politics of the elites or a self-destructive gratification born of rebellion
against the resurrected confessional social order.
BARCODE
78
The end of the civil War renders Lebanon’s neutrality a less important characteristic
in terms of the construction of national identity. In addition, challenges to a cohesive#p#分页标题#e#
sense of ‘Lebanisation’ have arisen as a result of the country’s membership and
different sects which have weakened substantially the relative homogeneity of the
Lebanese population. The 1989 TAEF Agreement and the 1994 AVIL represented the
common factors of political reconciliation between all Lebanese communities and
nation. They both enclosed laws and vital mean to assure communal harmony and
establish stability and peace between Lebanese communities.
Therefore, the major figure of Lebanon after the TAEF and AVIL shows the struggle
to build the conviviality between different sects and not a secular system.
The certain government leaders’ calls to “abolish” sectarianism and to efface all traces
of the war, has been disingenuous. The government has re-inscribed the
confessionally-based hierarchical social order while reconstructing the nation-state. If
it might be perceived as an oasis of equity, in fact it is an inappropriate chaos arising
from the country’s weak central government.
According to Zaim and Nahawand (1999), it is still too early to judge and measure the
extent to which the Lebanese televisions have been able to create a sense of national
identity, because of the sectarian structure of the society and the power of the
religious ‘Bosses’ who put obstacles in the introduction of change or application of
laws that may weaken the sectarian nature.
For the time being, it is the only way, Lebanon still in a period of healing, and for the
media, it is a hard task to go. Later it can raise the truth dosage. Therefore, plurality
and conviviality is not the purpose but a mean to achieve the purpose.
BARCODE
79
BIBLIOGRAPY
Books and Journal Papers:
Abu Hasna, N. (1999). Palestinians, Armenians, in the Lebanese newspapers. A case
study, published in march 1999 by the Palestinian authors’ comity. Damascus: Dar al
fikr al Arabi.
Alasuutari, P. (1995) Researching Culture, London: Sage.
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities (revised edition), London: Verso.
Appadurai et al., (1896). The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural
Perspective. Cambridge: University Press.
Archetti, E. P., (1994). “Masculinity and Football: The formation of national identity
in Argentina.” In Giulianotti, R. & Williams, J. (eds). Game without frontiers.
Football identity and modernity, 225-243. Arena, Aldershot.
Asmar, C., Kisirwani, M., and Springborg, R. (1999). ‘Clash of politics or
civilizations? Sectarianism among youth in Lebanon,’ Arab Studies Quarterly, 21(4)
35-64.
Bale, J., & Sang, J. (1996). Kenyan running. Movement culture, geography and global
change. London: Frank Gass.
Baudrillard, J. (1988). Selected Writings. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beydoun, A. (1984). Le Liban, une histoire disputee: identite et temps dans#p#分页标题#e#
l’histographie libanaise contemporaine. Beirut: Publications de L’Universite
Libanaise.
Beydoun, A. (1993). Le Liban: Itineraire dans une guerre incivile. Paris: Karthala.
BARCODE
80
Berger, P. L., (1966). Identity as a problem in the sociology of knowledge. European
Journal of Sociology, 7, 105-115.
Blain, N, Boyle, R, and O’Donnel, H. (1993). Sport, Europe and Collective Identity,
in Sport and National Identity in the European Media, pp 189-200. Leicester
University Press, Leicester, London and New York.
Boulos, J.C. (1995). Television : History and Stories. (translated from French : La
television au Liban: Quelle Histoire?. Beirut: Fishes du monde Arabe.
Boyd, D. (1991). “Lebanese broadcasting: Unofficial electronic media during a
prolonged civil war”. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 35 (3); 269-287.
Chebel, M. (1986): “La formation de L’identite politique” (translated from French:
the formation of the political identity). Paris: PUF.
Collins, R. (1990). Culture, Communication and National Identity. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Crilley, D. (1993). ‘Megastructures and urban change: Aesthetics, ideology, and
design,’ in P. Knox (ed.), The Restless Urban Landscape, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 127-164.
Dajani, N. (2002). Mission: journalism, a fix, and the world. London: Blackwell.
Deutsh, K. (1966). Nationalism and Social Communication. 2nd edition. New York:
MIT Press.
Douglas, M. & Isherwood, B. (1979). The World of Goods. New York: Penguin.
El-Khazen, Farid. (1991). “The Communal Pact of National Identities: the Making
and Politics of the 1943 National Pact” Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies.
Fares, Walid. (1979). Al-Taadudiya Fi Lubnan. Pluralism in Lebanon. Beirut. Kasleek
University Press.
Fares, Walid. (1980). Al-Fikr al-Lubnani wa Utruhat al-Taareeb. The Lebanese
Thought and the Thesis of Arabization." Beirut. Dar el Sharq.
Fawaz, Leila. (1994). An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus
in 1860. London: I.B. Tauris;
BARCODE
81
Fishman, J.A. (1972). Language and Nationalism. Two integrative essays. Roley,
MA: Newbury House.
Friedman, T. (1989). From Beirut to Jerusalem. New York:Doubleday.
Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism, Oxford, Basil Backwell Publishers.
Hall, S. (1992). The Question of Cultural Identity. In S. Hall, D. Held & T, McGrew
(Eds.), Modernity and its Futures, (p273-326). Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hansen, A. Cottle, S. Negrine, R. & Newbold, C. (Eds.)1998. Mass Communication
Research Methods. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Harvey, D. (1989). ‘From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation of
urban governance,’ Geografiska Annaler, 71B(9), 3-17.#p#分页标题#e#
Held, D. (1984). Central perspectives on the modern state. In G. McLeman, D. Held
and S. Hall (Eds.) The idea of modern state. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
Heidt, E.U. (1987). Mass Media, Cultural Tradition, and National identity.
Saarbrucken, Ford Lauderale: Verlag Breitenbach.
Hill, J. (1996). Rite of Spring: Cup Finals and Community in the North of England,
Hill, J. & Williams, J. eds, Sport and Identity in the North of England. Keele: Keele
University Press.1
Hobswam, E (1983). Introduction: Inventing Traditions in The Invention of Tradition
(eds) by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Jameson, F. (1991). Postmodernism- Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.
London: Verso.
Johnson, N. (1994). ‘Sculpting heroic histories: celebrating the centenary of the 1789
rebellion in Ireland,’ Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 19, 78-93.
Kymlicka, W. (1996). Ciudadania Multicultural. Barcelona. Paidos.
Krippendorf, K. (1981) Content Analysis: an Introduction to its Methodology,
London: Sage.
Kubursi, A. (1999). ‘Reconstructing the economy of Lebanon,’ Arab Studies
Quarterly, 21(1), 69-95.
Makdisi, S. (1997). ‘Laying claim to Beirut,’ Critical Inquiry, Spring, 663-705.
BARCODE
82
McCracken, G. (1988). Culture and Consumption: New Approaches to the Symbolic
Character of Consumer Goods and Activities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Morley, M. and Robins, K. (1995). Spaces of Identity, - Globa Media, Electronic
Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries. London and New York: Routledge.
Pandey, Gyanendra. (1992). The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North
India Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Poole, R. (1999). Nation and Identity. New York: Routledge.
Price. Monroe E. (1995). Television, the Public Sphere and National Identity, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Rowe, D., and Lawrence, G., (1986). “Saluting the State: Nationalism and The
Olympics” in Power Play, Essays In The Sociology of Australian Sport, Hale &
Iremonger, Sydney.
Salibi, Kamal. (1988). A House of Many Mansions: History of Lebanon Reconsidered
London: I.B. Tauris.
Schlesinger, P. (1991). Media, State and Nation: Political violence and collective
identities. Chapters 7, 8, and 9. London: Sage Publications.
Sinno, M. (2001), Television in Lebanon and in the Arab world. Beirut: Dar Al
Nahda.
Smith, A.D. (1991), National Identity, London, Penguin Books.
Till, K. (1999). ‘Staging the past: landscape designs, cultural identity, and
Erinnerungspolitik at Berlin’s Neue Wache,’ Ecumene, 6(3) 251-280.
Weeks, J. (1990). The value of difference. In J. Rutherford Berger (Ed. ), Identity:
community, culture,difference. London: Lawrence & Wishart.#p#分页标题#e#
Zaim, H. and Nahawand, A. (1999) Sectarian Media. Beirut: Dar al kitab al loubnani.
BARCODE
83
英国留学生媒体管理硕士论文Websites:
Al Nahar newspaper & http://www.naharonline.com.lb [accessed: 28/12/2003]
Saatchi and Saatchi advertising & / [accessed:
28/12/2003]
TAEF Agreement, Paragraph III, Article, G. & .
Dictionaries:
Oxford English Dictionary, (2003). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Governmental documents:
The Audio-Visual and Media Information Law issued in 1994. And, the AVIL
Guidebook and recommendations.
The TAEF accord issued in 1989.
Television and media productions:
Future Television International & www.futuretv.com.lb
Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (L.B.C.) & www.lbc.com.lb
BARCODE
84