代写留学生论文-领导力在理解市场行为中的作用-Understanding Market-Driving Behavior

four situations can characterize a firm:
(1) neither market-driven nor marketdriving;
(2) either market-driven or
market-driving; (3) sequentially marketdriving
and then market-driven; and
(4) only rarely market-driven and then
subsequently market-driving.
SCHINDEHUTTE, MORRIS, AND KOCAK 7
Table 1
Distinguishing Market-Driven and Market-Driving
Characteristic Market-Driven Market-Driving
Focus Is On Customer (Day 1999) All industry participants
(Morgan and Hunt 1995)
Customer Needs Expressed/observed Expressed/latent
Behavior toward
Customer
Customer-led (responsive
MO) Customer-leading
(proactive MO) (Narver,
Slater, and MacLachlan
2004)
Create new customers/
markets (Hamel and
Prahalad 1994)
Behavior toward
Competitors
Competitive positioning
(Porter 1980, 1985)
Competition, alliances, and
cooperation (Sarasvathy
2001)
Market Behavior Learning, understanding,
and responding to market
stakeholders (Jaworski
and Kohli 1993)
Proactively change
perceptions and behavior
of market stakeholders
(Kumar, Scheer, and
Kotler 2002)
Marketing Objectives Superior ability to
understand, satisfy and
retain valuable customers
(Day 1998)
Quantum leap increase in
value proposition (Kumar,
Scheer, and Kotler 2002)
Marketing Strategy Differentiation;
segmentation, targeting,
positioning; marketing
mix management;
Relationship marketing
(Alderson 1965)
Entrepreneurial mindset,
serendipity,
opportunity-focus
Entrepreneurial marketing
(Morris, Schindehutte and
Laforge 2002)
Dominant Strategic
Orientation
MO (with entrepreneurial
values) (Slater and Narver
1999)
EO (Covin and Slevin 1991)
Capabilities Inside out (Deshpande
2000)
Outside in (Deshpande
2000)
Culture Type Adhocracy (Carillat et al.
2004)
Market (Carillat et al. 2004)
Internal–External
Perspective
External, for example,
composition, role,
behaviors of customers,
and competitors (Jaworski,
Kohli, and Sahay 2000)
Internal dynamics for
example business systems
and intra-firm behavior
(Kumar, Scheer, and
Kotler 2002)
Value-Creating
Resources
Intangible market-based
assets, for example,
relational and intellectual
(Srivastava, Shervani, and
Fahey 1999)
Entrepreneurial capital
(Erikson 2002)
8 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
Other Strategic
Orientations: TO and EO
The concept of MO can be better
understood by considering other dominant
orientations in companies. Two
externally focused strategic orientations
warrant mention. Some firms demonstrate
what has been termed a strong
technology orientation (TO) (Noble,
Sihna, and Kumar 2002; Atuahene-Gima
and Ko 2001). Here, firms do not
develop an MO, as technical possibilities
push new products rather than markets
pulling those innovations (Hunt and
Morgan 1996). Technology and innovation
are prioritized over the
customer—the firm actually distances
itself from current customers (Berthon,
Hulbert, and Pitt 2004). With a strong
TO, investments are made in discontinuous
innovations and disruptive technologies
on the assumption that whole new
markets will result. The danger is that
the firm is too far ahead of the customer
or is addressing a problem that does not
translate into a substantive customer
need.
Extensive attention has been given
to a firm’s entrepreneurial orientation
(EO). An EO has three underlying dimensions:
innovativeness, risk taking, and
proactiveness (Lumpkin and Dess 2001,
1996; Covin and Slevin 1990, 1989;
Table 1
Continued
Characteristic Market-Driven Market-Driving
Organizational
Learning
Capability
Mastery of market-sensing
and customer-linking
capabilities (Day 1994)
Sense giving opportunity
recognition capability
(Day 1994)
Innovation Focus Incremental/dynamically
continuous (Christensen,
Johnson, and Rigby 2002)
Radical/ disruptive
innovation (Christensen,
Johnson, and Rigby
2002)
Trajectory Outcomes Organizational
transformation, evolution
(Covin and Slevin 1990)
Creative destruction
(Schumpeter 1934)
Source of Sustainable
Competitive
Advantage (SCA)
Market leadership;
differential advantage
(McKenna 1991)
Market ownership;
Configural advantage
(McKenna 1991)
Performance
Outcomes
Superior financial
performance (Jaworski
and Kohli 1993)
Persistent superior financial
performance in long term
(Kumar, Scheer, and
Kotler 2002)
Most Relevant
Theory
Resource-based view (RBV)
(Barney, 1991); dynamic
capabilities view (DCV)
(Teece, Pisano, and Shuen
1997)
Resource advantage theory
(Hunt and Morgan 1996)
Examples P&G, GE, Nokia, IBM, Sears,
3M, and AT&T
Swatch, eBay, Amazon.com,
Dell, IKEA, and Starbucks
SCHINDEHUTTE, MORRIS, AND KOCAK 9
Table 2
Strategic Orientation Data for Sensis Corporation
Sensis 1980s 1990s 2000s
Customer Needs Expressed Expressed Expressed
Innovation MO MO Radical/incremental (new
technology)
Market Incremental (upgrades and
improvements)
Radical/incremental New/existing
Approach to Segmentation Existing (air defense) New/existing (air traffic systems) New
Business System Employed Niche Niche Existing
Changing Customer Behavior Existing Existing No
Changing Competitor No No No
Behavior No No No
Changing Industry Structure No No Technological innovation
Source of Competitive Advantage Technological knowledge Creative problem solver and
innovator
TO
Dominant Strategic Orientation MO (responsive) MO (proactive) Expansive growth
Long-Run Effect Major contracts with federal
government
Innovation leader Product leadership
10 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
Miller 1983). Innovativeness refers to
the seeking of creative, unusual or
novel solutions to problems and needs.
These solutions take the form of new
technologies and processes, as well as
new products and services. Risk taking
involves the willingness to commit significant
resources to opportunities
having a reasonable chance of costly
failure. These risks are typically calculated
and manageable. Proactiveness is
concerned with implementation, with
doing what is necessary to bring an entrepreneurial
concept to fruition. It usually
entails considerable perseverance, adaptability,
and tolerance of failure. As different
degrees of innovativeness, risk
taking, and proactiveness are possible in
a particular entrepreneurial event, and
any number of such events is possible in
a given organization, entrepreneurship
can be said to occur in varying degrees
and frequencies (Morris and Kuratko
2002; Covin and Slevin 1991).
A series of studies has reported an
association between a company’s EO and
how the firm approaches strategy formulation
(Hitt and Reed 2000), organizational
structure (Pettigrew and Fenton
2000; Covin and Slevin 1991), corporate
culture (Timmons 1999), marketing philosophy
(Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Miles
and Arnold 1991), human resource management
practices (Morris and Jones
1999) and control systems (Morris,
Schindehutte, and Allen 2005). These
studies suggest that the challenge to
management lies in designing work environments
that are consistent with, and
reinforce entrepreneurial behavior on
the part of employees.
All firms have an EO. That is, while a
company may or may not be market- or
technology-oriented, it has some level of
innovativeness, risk taking, and proactiveness,
even if the level is quite low.
Norms for EO can be expected to vary
among industries, suggesting that any
one firm’s EO must be interpreted
relative to the industry within which it
competes (Morris and Kuratko 2002).
Furthermore, within a given industry,
there can be significant variance in the
levels of EO among firms (for example,
Starbucks versus a “mom and pop”
coffee shop). In a sense, then, EO transcends
all other orientations. As we shall
discuss, it can play an instrumental role
in some of these other orientations.
Entrepreneurial Capital,
Dynamic Capabilities, and
the Business Model
The ability to influence sustainable
competitive advantage centers on ways
in which the strategic orientation leads
the firm to develop superior resources
(Barney 1991), dynamic capabilities
(Teece and Pisano 1994), and isolating
mechanisms (Kor and Mahoney 2004;
Dyer and Singh 1998). An isolating
mechanism prevents the diffusion of
a superior resource capability to other
firms in an industry. Hence, the Dell
Direct model and Southwest Airlines’
unique culture are superior resources
that have sustained these firms for many
years. For their part, isolating mechanisms
are properties not of the resource
but of the management holding the
resource (Knott 2003; Knott, Bryce, and
Posen 2003). This brings us to the
concept of “entrepreneurial capital.”
Entrepreneurial capital includes
human and social capital that together
enable company leaders to envision the
future, recognize opportunity, develop
novel business models, pursue and mitigate
risks, leverage and combine unique
resource bundles, and demonstrate
tenacity in exploiting a given opportunity
(Erikson 2002; Lounsbury and Glynn
2001). Entrepreneurial capital makes
possible the unique combinations that
result in new products and markets and
the corresponding isolating mechanisms
that preempt easy replication of a given
advantage by competitors. The ability to
translate entrepreneurial capital into
SCHINDEHUTTE, MORRIS, AND KOCAK 11
market innovation is facilitated by the
firm’s dynamic capabilities (Teece,
Pisano, and Shuen 1997). These are the
processes or routines by which managers
alter the resource base to generate new
value-creating strategies. Visible outcomes
of dynamic capabilities are a transition
into new functional competencies
that better match market opportunities.
Entrepreneurial capital is the principal
determinant of the level of EO in a
company. At the time of start-up, the
founding entrepreneur or entrepreneurial
team is the source of entrepreneurial
capital. The critical need in companies as
they evolve is to embed entrepreneurial
capital in the management structure. That
is, it must transcend a “dominant entrepreneur”
such as Michael Dell, Steven
Jobs, or Anita Roddick, and become a part
of an innovation culture (Hult et al. 2002),
in which values and beliefs are upheld by
all employees within a firm. Furthermore,
it must be reinforced by the firm’s human
resource management practices and
control systems. For sustainability, entrepreneurial
capital must be continually
enriched, while isolating mechanisms
cannot be allowed to degenerate. The
important role of the founding entrepreneur(
s) in delimiting the firm’s entrepreneurial
capital also has implications for
trajectories in the firm’s strategic orientation.
It is our contention that the earliest
stages in a venture’s life often determine
or delimit the extent to which the firm
becomes market-driven or marketdriving,
and by extension, the subsequent
trajectories in strategic orientation. Specifically,
we suggest that signs of marketdriving
potential appear early in the life
cycle of a firm. A strong EO coupled with
ample entrepreneurial capital leads to a
unique business model that shapes the
structure and behavior of a market.
The business model itself warrants
mention in this context as it is a primary
vehicle for capturing the firm’s approach
to the external environment. It captures
the unique value combinations, which
enable a firm to redefine existing markets
and create new ones. Morris, Schindehutte,
and Allen (2005) have provided
an integrative framework for capturing
a firm’s business model consisting of six
decision areas: how the firm creates
value, for whom value is created, the
source of internal advantage, the source
of external differentiation, the model for
making money, and the time and growth
aspirations of the firm. Importantly, their
framework distinguishes the need to
make decisions in each of these areas at
three levels, which they label the foundation,
proprietary, and rules levels. It is at
the proprietary level that we find the
unique combinations that explain how
Dell or Southwest Airlines is able to drive
markets. In the case of many of the
market-driving firms cited in the literature,
we find a fairly revolutionary business
model, which, with only very minor
modifications, drives the market for an
extended period of time. This business
model tends to be in place early on, in
effect establishing the DNA of the firm.
Toward an Integrative
Model
The relationships between strategic
orientation (MO, TO, and EO), marketdriving
behavior, and sustainable advantage
remain unclear. Toward this end, an
integrative model is proposed that captures
how sustainable advantages evolve
through the dynamics of the interface
between marketing and entrepreneurship
from both a content and process
perspective (see Figure 1). In the model,
constructs related to marketing and
entrepreneurship are depicted in clear
and dark-shaded boxes, respectively.
The model depicts how disruption of
existing capabilities of competitors can
promote sustainable performance differences
across firms as a result of a
market-driving effect associated with
revolutionary new resources and capabilities.
It explains some of the anomalies
12 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
in previous studies where market-driving
is considered to be an antecedent as
opposed to an outcome of innovation.
This dynamic model links industryspecific
and firm-specific factors with
strategic orientations (EO, MO, and TO)
as drivers of the nature and type of innovation
produced by the firm over time.
Two mediating processes, organizational
learning and opportunity recognition,
occur simultaneously and have complementary,
synergistic effects on the firm’s
approach to the market. Interaction
between the firm’s opportunity recognition
process in response to its external
environments and the firms’ internal
learning capabilities may lead to marketdriving
behavior and superior financial
performance as a result of disruptive
innovation. Innovation can be sustaining
or disruptive and can include products,
services, processes, business models,
and system architecture. Market-driving
behavior results from the channeling of
these antecedent variables into discontinuous
innovation.
Specifically, dynamic and evolutionary
new capabilities and competencies
become outcomes that (1) act as isolating
mechanisms because they nullify the
very competencies and capabilities associated
with sustainable competitive
advantages for the firm and its competitors;
(2) boost performance measures in
the short term, and (3) increase the duration
of superior performance because of
a continuous feed-back and feed-forward
mechanism. The result is a level of superior
performance that is sustainable for
much longer periods than would result
simply from any of the individual antecedent
conditions by themselves. Let us
examine the elements of the model in
more detail.
Factors from Inside and Outside
the Firm Affecting the
Marketing–Entrepreneurship
Interface
Both industry- and firm-specific
factors can be potential sources of sus-
Figure 1
An Integrative Model of How Sustainable Advantages
Evolve through Path-Dependent Trajectories
Strategic Orientations
Innovation
Market
Orientation
Environment/
Market Factors
Disruptive
Innovation
Entrepreneurial
Orientation
Technology
Orientation
Firm-specific
Factors
Path-dependent Trajectories
Market
Driving
Behavior
Entrepreneurial
Capital
Sustainability
of Superior
Performance
Relational
Capital
Opportunity
Recognition
Organizational
Learning Sustaining
Innovation
SCHINDEHUTTE, MORRIS, AND KOCAK 13
tainable competitive advantage. Environment
or market forces such as
demand uncertainty, technological
turbulence, and competitive intensity
create industry-specific effects based on
an “outside in” perspective (Porter
1985, 1980). According to this perspective,
the firm consists of a bundle of
activities that interacts with components
of the market such as customers, competitors,
and stakeholders as it seeks a
relative positional advantage (McGahan
and Porter 1997). By contrast, the
“inside out” perspective focuses on
firm-specific factors such as competencies
(Sanchez and Heene 1996),
dynamic capabilities (Teece and Pisano
1994), and idiosyncratic bundles of
resources (Barney 1991). These firmspecific
factors potentially have strategic
value as a result of their rarity, durability,
inappropriability, imperfect imitability
and imperfect substitutability.
Strategic Orientations at the
Marketing–Entrepreneurship
Interface
Zhou, Yim, and Tse (2005) have suggested
a need to consider the interactive
effects of the three strategic orientations.
In the integrative framework
presented here, a particular strategic orientation
is dominant at different stages
in the evolution of the firm through a
feed-back and feed-forward mechanism,
resulting in path-dependent trajectories.
Other studies suggest that the primary
source of sustainable competitive advantage
is derived from either MO, EO, or
TO. For instance, Day (1998) contends
that
a robust market orientation can
enhance the effectiveness of any
strategy, and serve as one of the
few sustainable sources of advantage
left in an environment of
rapid technology change and
aggressive competitive imitation
and leap-frogging of strategies.
Even firms with first class technologies
and business systems
have only the necessary conditions
for success; unless they have
superior skills in understanding,
satisfying and retaining customers
they will not realize their full
potential.
Several studies in marketing journals
have attempted to explain new value
creation by high-performing firms using
constructs from the domain of entrepreneurship
such as risk management
(Kumar, Scheer, and Kotler 2002),
proactiveness (Narver, Slater, and
MacLachlan 2004; Jaworski, Kohli, and
Sahay 2000; Day 1999), innovativeness
(Deshpande 2000; Kumar, Scheer, and
Kotler 2002), and an opportunity focus
(Jaworski, Kohli, and Sahay 2000). Most
notable is that companies cited as
examples of market-driving behavior
are revered for their entrepreneurial
leadership, not their marketing
prowess.
The Role of Innovation
Innovation has been associated with
competitive advantage by a number
of contemporary researchers (e.g.,
Matsuno, Mentzer, and Ozsomer 2002;
Pettigrew and Fenton 2000). Moreover,
the role of innovation in facilitating the
MO–performance relationship is well
documented with specific attention to
technical and administrative innovation
(Han, Kim, and Srivastava 1998), product
innovation (Verhees and Meulenberg
2004), and radical or incremental
innovation (Zhou, Yim, and Tse 2005).
An analysis of previous studies has found
that though innovation is an important
result of MO and EO, higher levels
of EO are associated with discontinuous
innovation. Furthermore, business
process and business model
innovation can result in isolating
mechanisms that enable market-driving
behavior.
14 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
Two Organizational Processes
Operating at the Marketing–
Entrepreneurship Interface
As an important mediating process,
organizational learning operates from
the outside in causing the firm to passively
respond to the market (Matsuno,
Mentzer, and Ozsomer 2002). Sustaining
innovation is directly prompted by the
learning process of firms competing in
an existing market or segment based on
their comparative advantage and relative
financial performance (Hunt 2000).
However, this learning process does not
facilitate development of the foresight
required to innovate creatively in order
to anticipate customers’ future or unarticulated
needs (Hamel and Prahalad
1994). In order to proactively change
the market, the firm must engage in
entrepreneurial behavior through the
process of opportunity discovery and
exploitation (Kirzner 1997; Venkataraman
1997). Opportunity discovery
enables firms to anticipate unarticulated
or new needs, to envision marketing
offerings and to acquire, develop or
create the required resources associated
with this proactive innovation, resulting
in a sustainable competitive advantage
and enduring superior financial
performance.
Performance and the Marketing–
Entrepreneurship Interface
Various studies have examined the
relationship between MO and performance,
EO and performance, the
combined effect of EO and MO on
performance, and specific factors that
moderate these relationships. Findings
indicate that MO and EO tend to be correlated,
that performance is positively
associated with an alignment between
MO and EO, and hence that an interactive
effect between MO and EO exists
(George and Zahra 2002; Atuahene-
Gima and Ko 2001). Although the continued
realization of superior financial
performance is important, a second performance
dimension relates to prospective
firm behavior as a result of renewal
of firm-specific resources and transformation
of industry-specific components.
More specifically, one manifestation of
the strategic orientation of the firm concerns
its behavior as market-driving or
market-driven. Most studies on marketdriven/
driving behavior focus only on
the creation of competitive advantage
and whether it can be sustained.
Concentrating on economic rents, they
ignore other outcomes of sustaining a
competitive advantage as a result of
firm-specific isolating mechanisms.
These other performance outcomes
cannot be measured quantitatively and
are not absolute. Instead, they are the
result of a knowledge discovery process
that qualitatively contributes to an
enduring competitive advantage.
Evolutionary Effects Impacting the
Marketing–Entrepreneurship
Interface
The process whereby current endowments
of resources, competences, and
capabilities are transformed or renewed
as a result of innovation activities in
response to changing market conditions
is progressive and dynamic (Teece,
Pisano, and Shuen 1997). Development
of firm-specific isolating mechanisms
during the evolution of dynamic capabilities
enables the creation of a sustainable
competitive advantage that impacts performance
(Jaworski, Kohli, and Sahay
2000; MacMillan and McGrath 1997). The
interplay between dynamic capabilities
(for example, market sensing, customer
linking, and strategic thinking) and the
different elements in the proposed
model result in path-dependent “trajectories”
as the firm evolves (Kor and
Mahoney 2004). We shall elaborate on
the concept of trajectories in the succeeding
discussions.
SCHINDEHUTTE, MORRIS, AND KOCAK 15
How Company
Orientations Evolve:
A Trajectories Perspective
The question then becomes one of
identifying how all of the strategic
orientations that are central to our model
individually or collectively evolve in companies.
It is our contention that trajectories
appear in the dominant orientations
of firms over time. Furthermore, although
any number of trajectories is possible,
developments earlier in the life of a firm
often delimit the types of patterns that
subsequently emerge. Let us first revisit
the relationship between market-driven
and market-driving orientations.
Examination of various orientations as
a firm evolves from start-up to maturity,
innumerable patterns might be expected
to emerge. Yet if we examine firms that
are successful over the long term, it would
seem certain trajectories are more likely
than others. Two assumptions underlie
our trajectory perspective. First, EO is
dynamic, and this drives these evolutionary
trajectories. Second, firms are
assumed to be operating in environments
that reflect moderate or high levels of
turbulence (hence, the firm is not a
monopolist with captive demand and
fixed technologies). Let us examine four
benchmark situations, each representing
a firm that begins with a different dominant
orientation.
(1) Consider a firm that starts off with a
dominant internal orientation (that is,
more focused on production, people
issues, or financial management).
Given the innovative behaviors of
competitors, survival will depend on
the presence of at least a moderate
level of EO. Specifically, the sustainability
of the firm will depend on it
ultimately making the transition to a
customer orientation or market-driven
orientation (reactive or proactive),
and moderate levels of EO will determine
whether this transition occurs.
(2) As a second scenario, let us assume a
company begins with an overarching
technological orientation. Two major
possibilities seem likely if the firm is
successful over time. If it demonstrates
a moderate level of EO, it will
transition into a market-driven (proactive)
company. If instead it demonstrates
a high level of EO, it may
transition into a market-driving
company, and then perhaps later
into a market-driven firm.
(3) A third scenario finds the firm beginning
as market-driven (reactive or
proactive). With at least moderate
levels of EO, we believe this posture
is sustainable indefinitely.
(4) The fourth scenario involves a firm
that starts out as market-driving. This
position is not possible without high
levels of EO. As it consolidates gains
from the new frontiers that are chartered,
the firm may subsequently
transition into a market-driven firm,
with a corresponding moderate level
of EO. However, it is also possible
that the firm will cycle over time
between periods of high EO and
market-driving behavior, and moderate
EO and market-driven behavior.
Certain other trajectories would seem
untenable over time. Examples include
having a strong TO with a low EO, or
attempting to transition an internally oriented
firm into a market-driving one.
Furthermore, with low levels of EO, the
only likely transitions will be in the
direction of a more reactive, less innovative
orientation than that which is currently
dominant.
The transition from market-driven to
market-driving would seem particularly
problematic. A market-driven company
that is organized to generate, process,
disseminate and act on intelligence from
existing markets, would require significant
unlearning, markedly different skills
and resources, and dramatic cultural
change to shift into a market-driving
16 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
mode. Some market-driven companies
seemingly flip-flop between different
strategic orientations, trying to become
market-driving but unable to do so, or
unable to stay market-driving for any
extended period of time, and therefore
failing to obtain an enduring and sustainable
competitive advantage. Consequently,
their outcomes become
customer-leading, pioneering or
technology-focused. This is because truly
market-driving behavior is predicated on
dynamics requiring superior integration
of multiple factors that are ultimately
forged by an individual’s market sensing,
visioning, and entrepreneurial capabilities.
All the market-driving companies
started small, but their market-driving
potential was inscribed in their DNA.
IBM on the other hand is an example of
a market driver that fell from grace and
cannot regain market driver status.
Market-driven companies fight for
market leadership and alternate between
leader and fast follower (e.g., P&G and
Kimberley Clark with disposable
diapers), or eventually decide to exit the
market. Alternatively, an MO causes the
leader(s) to be so focused on the served
market that they lose sight of emerging
markets that seem unattractive at first
(e.g., Xerox and Kodak both relinquishing
the market for smaller copiers to
Canon, or Sears misinterpreting the
threat of Wal-Mart).
As previously noted, a company with
a TO (e.g., a biotech start-up) could be
neither market-driven nor marketdriving.
Similarly, many firms are only
market-driven at a given point in time
(e.g., Target Stores and Nordstrom) or
market-driving for a period of time (e.g.,
Wal-Mart). Hence, at one time early
in their respective histories, Sears,
McDonalds, and Xerox were arguably
market-driving, and all three became
market-driven. This position is reinforced
by Kumar, Scheer, and Kotler
(2002), who argue that market-driving
companies are usually new entrants to
the industry, although there are exceptions.
The history of innovation is a
pattern in which bursts of breakthrough
innovation that reshape an industry, are
interspersed by flows of less dramatic
incremental improvements. Once the
radical innovation phase is over,
improvements to the existing offering
and business system becomes the
primary, immediate challenge. Furthermore,
competitors ultimately emerge
with competitive, or even superior,
value propositions and business systems
modeled after the new market leader. It
is at this stage that market-driving firms
must search for their next marketdriving
innovation, or lose its competitive
advantage to a new incumbent.
Yet certain market-driving companies
continue to be market-driving for an
extended period of time—they might
engage in market-driven behavior in the
short term as an underlying strategy but
the overall result is that they are marketdriving.
Companies such as IKEA, Southwest
Airlines, and Starbucks literally
“own the market,” achieving long-run
equilibrium with supranormal profits
and hence a sustained competitive
advantage. They started as small insignificant
companies with revolutionary
ideas (not products) and poor financial
performance. Once they recognized
sources of sustainable advantage, they
became market drivers and never looked
back.
Trajectories in Practice:
Two Case Studies
To further investigate the trajectories
perspective, the authors pursued two
in-depth case studies. The selected SME
firms each had a history of significant
growth since inception, and each eventually
achieved strong financial performance.
Furthermore, firms were selected
for their diversity. Both low- and hightechnology
companies were included,
with one operating in consumer markets
SCHINDEHUTTE, MORRIS, AND KOCAK 17
and one in industrial markets. Though
subjective in nature, the conclusions
regarding dominant strategic orientations
are based on archival research,
which focused on corporate documents,
press releases, trade literature, and the
company website. Information related to
eras during which the firms exhibited
different strategic orientations was tabulated
and the evolving orientations in
each firm were summarized graphically.
The transitions between different strategic
orientations are shown in different
shades whereas the width of the bar
indicates the relative strength of the
orientation.
Case I: Sensis Corporation
Founded in 1985 by a group of experienced
engineers, Sensis has evolved as a
global player that is known as an innovator
and developer of real-world solutions.
Figure 2 graphically summarizes the
dynamics of Sensis’ strategic orientations
over time. Sensis started with a predominantly
responsive MO serving the Air
Defense industry with radar and air
defense systems. Its ability to work
closely with its customers, understand
their needs and cost-efficiently solve
problems with the latest technologies, led
to numerous contracts with U.S. Navy,
U.S. Marines, Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), and major Aerospace corporations.
Over time, Sensis’s marketdriven
orientation, problem-solving
skills, and market-sensing abilities (proactive
MO) contributed to development of
new solutions and products.
As indicated in Table 3, the company
initially displayed moderate to high levels
of EO with a flat hierarchy and projectbased
structure. In the 1980s, Sensis produced
few entrepreneurial events, which
were nominally innovative, risky, and
proactive. In 1990s, Sensis highly adapts
to the changes in industry and provides
continuous stream of product and service
improvements with occasional new
product entry (Target Data Extractor,
Automatic Dependents Surveillance-
Broadcast technology, and Multistatic
Dependent Surveillance system). In the
2000s, Sensis produced fewer entrepreneurial
events by introducing few
changes/upgrades for its products and
services, and increasingly became more
technology-oriented and technologydriven.
Since 1994, Sensis has been leveraging
its technological knowledge and
engineering experience to solve critical
issues across different industry segments
such as the Air Traffic industry, leading to
a predominantly technological orientation
coupled with global expansion and
partnerships.
Figure 2
Strategic Orientation Trajectories for Sensis Corporation
1980 1990 2000 2010
Proactive
Market Orientation
Responsive
Market Orientation
Entrepreneurial
Orientation
Technology Orientation
18 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
Table 3
Strategic Orientation Data for Jones Soda Co.
Jones Soda Co. 1995–1997 1998–1999 2000–2005
Dominant Strategic
Orientation
Responsive MO Proactive MO and EO Proactive MO and EO
Customer Needs Expressed Latent Expressed
Market Existing (new age beverage) Existing and new (all natural
soda)
Existing and new
(international)
Approach to Segmentation Niche Niche (premium soda) Mainstream (carbonated soft
drink)
Product/Service Innovation Incremental (new category) Radical (new product line) Incremental (new flavors and
brands)
Business Model Employed Existing New Existing
Source of Competitive
Advantage
Distribution Interactive communication Brand management
Changing Customer Behavior Low cost marketing Distributor network Patented process
Changing Competitor Yes Yes (Image instead of taste) No
Behavior No Yes No
Changing Industry Structure No Yes No
Long-Run Effect Extraordinary growth Leader in premium soda
segment
High awareness
SCHINDEHUTTE, MORRIS, AND KOCAK 19
Case II: Jones Soda
Jones Soda Co. (founded in 1987 as
Urban Juice and Soda Company Ltd)
started as a distributor of other companies’
beverage lines such as Arizona Iced
Tea and Thomas Kemper sodas. Utilizing
experience and knowledge gained in distribution,
Jones Soda Co. started launching
its own brands in 1995. The
evolution of strategic orientations for
Jones Soda Co. is summarized in Figure 3
and Table 3. Jones Soda Co. transitioned
from its initial responsive MO as a beverage
distributor company into an EO
when it entered the emerging new age
beverage industry in 1995. Shortly thereafter,
the company launched several noncarbonated
soft drinks with unusual
colors and added a distinct fashion component
to the drink which created a new
category (all natural soda) in the new age
or alternative beverage market. Since
2001, Jones Soda Co. has focused on
product line extensions (e.g., new
flavors, turkey and gravy soda) and the
addition of new product lines (for
example, energy drinks, diet sodas, carbonated
soft drink, and organic tea line)
in order to maintain the vitality of the
product range. In 2004, the company
entered the mainstream carbonated soft
drink industry in which Pepsi and Coca-
Cola dominates and extended the brand
into nonalternative beverage products
and nonbeverage products (e.g., lip
balms) which reflects an EO combined
with a proactive MO.
The market-driving strategy revolves
around unique alternative beverage
brands and products for new and existing
markets through independent distribution
networks. Jones Soda Co.
reconfigured existing distribution channels
by securing exclusive and selective
distribution agreements with unique
retail venues such as snowboarding
shops, tattoo parlors, as well as boutique
fashion and music stores. Its
radical approaches to brand management
have redefined the market space
and changed consumers’ perceptions
through brand ownership. A virtual
community of fans gathers at the company’s
website to create new products,
chat, blog, enter contests, share movie
reviews and download freebies. In
2002, Jones Soda Co. was issued a
patent for its myjones.com business
operation. The presence of this unique
business system and several rulebreaking
behaviors suggests that this
young company might join the ranks of
other well-known market drivers. An
interesting feature of the Jones Soda Co.
case is that its financial performance is
not extraordinary despite its market
ownership status and a clear sustainable
competitive advantage.
Figure 3
Strategic Orientation Trajectories for Jones Soda Co.
20 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
Conclusions and
Suggestions for Future
Research
The market lies at the center of any
attempt to understand sustainable competitive
advantage within firms. Over the
past quarter century, we have witnessed
fundamental changes in the nature of
markets and marketing. These changes
hold important implications for the
strategic orientation of firms, and vice
versa. The extent to which the firm
adopts a predominantly technology,
market-driven, or EO will influence how
it performs within the new competitive
landscape. These orientations guide the
behavior and activities of internal stakeholders
and relationships with external
stakeholders. Unfortunately, much of the
contemporary research approaches strategic
orientation at a point in time. In this
paper, we have argued for a trajectories
perspective on strategic orientation such
that orientations evolve dynamically
resulting in multiple orientations over
time.
In recent years, the marketing literature
has placed significant emphasis on
market-driving and proactive marketdriven
behavior within firms. Arguably,
these attempts to reconceptualize the
meaning of “market orientation” are a
tacit recognition of the demands of the
emerging marketplace. This paper makes
a contribution by bringing order to the
terms market-driven and market-driving.
Part of the confusion stems from the two
names that seem related in that they
suggest opposing behaviors, that is,
market-driven versus market-driving
when in fact they are vastly different
concepts. In contrast to previous studies,
the proposed model treats market-driven
behavior as an aspect of market orientation,
which precedes innovation, whereas
market-driving behavior is a potential
outcome of breakthrough innovation.
To date, the general consensus in the
literature has been that these two constructs
were extensions of MO. However,
there are many discrepancies in this
logic, which we have pointed out in our
analysis. Marketing literature cannot
explain observations of market ownership
in firm such as Harley Davidson,
Starbucks, and Swatch using MO. Some
try to position market-driving as an
emergent form of MO, borrowing concepts
from entrepreneurship domain to
explain. Entrepreneurship scholars in
turn have also not been able to unravel
the mysteries behind the highly soughtafter
market-driving behavior. They have
been searching for clues in the strategy
domain. Consequently, the second contribution
can be found in the nexus of
MO and EO as key strategic orientations
underlying market-driving behavior.
Third, we argue that market-driving is
not the opposite of market–driven; nor is
it an extension of market-driven. These
two constructs are not part of a continuum.
MO, and by extension marketdriven
behavior, is a set of competencies
associated with the enactment of the
marketing concept. Market-driving
behavior is not part of MO, but instead
the emergence of market-driving behavior
is the essence of entrepreneurial
action in the Schumpeterian “creative
destruction” sense. Consequently,
market-driving refers to the outcomes
from innovation activities and is in itself
an indicator of sustainable advantage.
A market-driven orientation mediates
customer interactions, whereas a marketdriving
mediates performance and therefore
sustainable competitive advantage
in the long term.
A fourth, and perhaps the most important
contribution, can be found in
the new insight about the competitive
behavior of market-drivers. Whereas the
challenge with a market-driven orientation
lies in understanding how it can
be achieved and sustained through
better generation, dissemination of,
and response to market intelligence
organization-wide, the challenge with
SCHINDEHUTTE, MORRIS, AND KOCAK 21
market-driving lies in ensuring that
others cannot achieve or sustain it by constantly
leading the market and exploring
the “white space” (Hamel and Prahalad
1994). Market driving is not a benchmarking
activity, nor is it something other
organizations can learn. The market
driver innovates at a faster rate, with
higher frequency and greater disruptive
force, thereby ensuring an enduring
sustainable competitive advantage. Consequently,
we propose that our conceptualization
of market driving extends
existing perspectives on performance
measures as a different type of indicator
of the presence of a sustainable competitive
advantage. Others have established
that financial performance is an inadequate
indicator of a firm’s long-term
competitive position (Johnson and
Kaplan 1987). Similarly, the long-term
performance of market-drivers transcends
financial performance, highlighting
the significance of market-driving
behavior and entrepreneurial capital as
indicators of a firm’s future potential
(Erikson 2002).
An additional contribution can be
found in the trajectories perspective. The
integrative framework illustrates the
dynamics at the interface between
marketing and entrepreneurship from a
content and process perspective. It
explains how the firm’s EO underlies
other strategic orientations, determining
how they are manifested and, in some
cases, whether they are manifested,
thereby playing a critical role in
determining transitions among various
strategic orientations over time. The integrative
model and trajectories perspective
also provide direction for ongoing
research. A number of suggestions have
been made herein regarding types of trajectories
that might be expected to
unfold as companies evolve. Further
research is needed to better understand
how orientations evolve in companies. In
addition, though it has been suggested
that the early stages of a venture effectively
delimit the nature of subsequent
trajectories, empirical evidence is needed
to confirm this supposition. Also,
although strategic orientations evolve,
it would seem that particular triggers
initiate a move in the direction of a new
orientation, whereas various corporate
climate variables facilitate or hinder such
movement. Further insights are needed
into these triggering and facilitating
factors. Lastly, it is important to uncover
the roles of industry type, technology,
market characteristics in explaining differences
in how strategic orientations
evolve, and how different approaches to
the market affect sustainable advantage
and performance.
As our work is exploratory, it would
be necessary to consider alternative
frameworks with which to better capture
market driving. The variety of effects
associated with time, industry, market,
strategy, resources, and capabilities of
interest are intertwined and difficult to
disentangle (Rouse and Daellenbach
2002). Questions that come to mind
include whether there are other factors
than the ones considered in our integrative
framework and whether there is a
more optimal configuration of the different
interactions. Another task would be
to validate the model empirically in a
longitudinal study to capture the time
dimension. A different issue concerns the
metrics one could use to identify and
measure market-driving outcomes. Additionally,
it would be useful to examine
the factors that cause successful transitions
between different strategic orientations
as well as the duration of major
transformation processes.
In conclusion, we argue that Wiggins
and Ruefli (2005) were almost right
when they proposed that “. . . something
is clearly affecting the ability of firms and
business units to sustain performance,
and in the absence of compelling alternative
explanations we argue that that
something is likely hypercompetition.”
However, that something is not hyper-
22 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
competition (which might be an underlying
cause), but is more likely marketdriving
behavior.
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